Mons Graupius Identified
Mons Graupius - A Reconstruction (Part Two)
Close order infantry fighting was the preferred mode of combat for Roman infantry, particularly legionaries. The men deployed here however were auxiliaries who while trained for close order fighting were more used to more open order conditions.
Unless Tacitus is regaling us with stock phraseology on the nature of such contests with Celts through the ages, all we have to go on is his narrative is that the Roman fighting stance aided the auxiliaries over the Caledonians who appear, on the reading of the text to have suffered early the effects of crowd crush.
This crushing was the likely result of the excited Caledonian rear ranks pushing forward onto the front ranks leaving them crushed against the Romans shields with scant space to wield their weapons and vulnerable with only small shields to protect themselves.
The fight seems to have gone ominously one way from the start, and while Tacitus is no doubt exaggerating the success of the auxiliary line – now joined by the rest of the auxiliary battleline – it did however seem at this stage to have taken the upper hand pushing forward up off the plain onto the lower slopes near Boghall.
The Caledonians however must have maintained cohesion, like the English centre at Flodden in 1513 any force that survives being pushed back over 200 yards is clearly not being over-run but is managing to maintain order in the face of adversity.
The Caledonian front lines were not therefore beaten comprehensively as described by Tacitus but were pushed back by the relentless close order advance of the auxiliaries.
The Roman advance however appears to have started losing impetus, no doubt as the effects of the slope took its toll on tired legs and as fresh Caledonians were fed into the battleline.
Obviously things needed shoring as at this stage the loose milling Caledonian "groups" behind appear to have broiled round the flanks of the auxiliary battleline, a move countered by Agricola moving the cavalry stationed on the wings to charge in to the Caledonians flanks like book-ends in an attempt to push them back in behind their own front line.
CLICK ON MAP TO ENLARGE
Tacitus is quite forthright in describing the resultant crush. These 3,000 cavalrymen were hampered by the steadfast defence of the Caledonians as well as "the roughness of the ground" – meaning by this stage they may have been on a more considerable gradient – added to the already congested struggling mass in the centre – "most unlike a cavalry action" Tacitus tells us.
It is inconceivable, with disciplined order breaking down that the Romans at this stage were not on the receiving end of notable casualties themselves as mens legs gave way through exhaustion and the crush of the press.
The field and slopes of battle at Mons Graupius viewed from Middle Third. The bulk of the fighting took place near the centre of this shot at Boghall, and it is from here (and to the right) that Agricola's reserve cavalry - having reached the heights - charged down on the Caledonians on the slopes.
Seeing this key development – and it would appear Agricola, holding his nerve, had still not got his legions moving – that the Caledonian leadership, sensing the critical phase of the battle had arrived ordered forward their remaining tribesmen.
Charging forward those in the centre added their weight to the crush – which at this stage must have been truly horrendous – while many more swirled around the flanks to come to grips with their enemies.
CLICK ON MAP TO ENLARGE
Men would be hacking, heaving, pushing and struggling to keep both on their feet and to maintain even that precious inch or so to enable them to breathe. Maimed and wounded horses would be thrashing about with men on both sides crushed by their flailing hooves and it is probably around this time that the (infantry) cohort Prefect Aulus Atticus was killed, probably pulled off a hamstrung and gutted mount.
The chaos of close order combat as shown in the TV drama Rome.
This then was the inglorious and horrendous reality of ancient warfare, up close and personal.
And that would appear to be what Agricola had waited for – a complete Caledonian commitment in the centre of the field. Now was the turning point of the battle as he deployed his hidden cavalry reserve to such devastating effect.
This force, probably some 2,000 strong would appear to have taken a circuitous ride round the west of Dun Knock then due south where they will have forced a passage across the Dunning Burn high up the hillside near Balquhandy.
Executing a smart wheel in line abreast they will then have charged downhill into the rear of the Caledonians, all of whom by now were busily engaged with the Roman auxiliaries to their front.
And this hammerblow was without doubt conclusive.
The final nail in the coffin of Caledonian resistance would be the sudden appearance of the legions who by now would have been ordered up by Agricola.
Even though not directly mentioned by Tacitus this would have had the same morale sapping impact suffered by the English at Bannockburn and the French at Waterloo (both of whom dissolved in panic) when faced with the imminent arrival of enemy reinforcements.
CLICK ON MAP TO ENLARGE
On the slopes of the Clevage Hills it most probably led to a general Caledonian collapse.
Tacitus glossed over the legions deployment and we believe he does not mention their eventual impact on Caledonian morale in order to obfuscate the legions somewhat inglorious role so far during the fighting. Smoke and mirrors.
Celtic society held a warriors brave death in battle in very high esteem indeed and Tacitus mentions many warriors choosing this over flight or captivity. For the masses though, farmers in attendance by tribal obligation, the main concern would be to escape the slaughter with kith and kin now that the "game" was clearly over.
And at that, in most cases, it will have been every man for himself, sometimes seeking safety in numbers, at other times seeking safety alone from the hacking blades of the pursuing cavalry depending upon circumstances.
Back over the ridge of the Clevage Hills, through their bivouac and down its reverse slopes, rough broken country with deep defiles they will have run pell mell. And here the leading elements of the pursuit came to grief, halted by groups of Caledonians clearly selling their lives dearly to assist their friends – and any family who attended the hosting - to escape.
The end came swiftly and many Caledonians escaped back over the Clevage Hills escarpment and down across the Water of May. It is around here that the Caledonians turned on their rash first pursuers to good effect.
How did they get so far before the enthusiastic outriders of the chase – Tacitus’s "first rash pursuers" caught up with them?
The evidence would clearly suggest some time passed before a full mounted pursuit got underway beyond the battlefield, clearly showing havoc reigned on the field for a considerable time, probably as the Caledonian front and centre, with little scope for easy withdrawal were gradually overcome.
Tacitus grandly claims 10,000 Caledonians fell. This will have included wounded and injured, of no value in the Roman slave markets and dispatched where they lay.
What of this figure of 10,000 fallen?
Without a shadow of a doubt Agricola was merely the first and certainly not the last recorded invader who, eventually successful in battle after frustrating campaigns in Scotland felt compelled to magnify the scale of their victory in order to assuage their otherwise bruised egos.
The pundits of later English Kings and generals would continue to claim similar fantastically rounded numbers of Scots and French casualties with a monotonous regularity which merely urges us to exercise caution in blithely accepting such formulaic and partial reporting.
That said and accepted there are a few statistics that that have been quoted in recent years on the casualties incurred in ancient and medieval battles which are worth considering.
Mons Graupius we must bear in mind was at the end of the day a signal defeat for the Caledonians. Precedence exists for us in the records of other decisive battles to not necessarily dismiss a loss of a third of the Caledonians at Mons Graupius as being altogether impossible.
Even the notably militarily successful English have suffered badly through the years in this way; a third of Boudicca’s behemoth of 240,000 were butchered by the Romans at Mancetter by a smaller Roman force than Agricola deployed at Dunning, a third of the Lancastrians never made it off the field at Towton, at least a third of the English were massacred at Stirling Bridge and while a greater number than this eventually forded the Bannockburn over a damn of their own drowned, few of the English (infantry) it appears subsequently made it home.
Three of these battles are all noteworthy in having a watercourse that significantly impeded the flight of the defeated - the tribes own wagons did the honours at Mancetter. The Water of May lies behind the Clevage Hills.
Further, losses in any defeat always appear to have been at their worst in a rout as cavalry’s prime role in the aftermath of battle was to pursue and harry the fugitives, principally to ensure a beaten army stayed beaten and did not regroup.
The Caledonians did not regroup – arguing for the comprehensive nature of the defeat sustained to a well led Roman army fielded with what appears to have been a great deal of thought given beforehand as to the manner in which the action would be fought. The chase, as discussed above did not start early enough – or well - for the Romans and this explains why (at least) two thirds of the Caledonians won their freedom from the fateful field of battle and were not trampled underfoot in the Water of May.
We do not believe therefore that the hills, burns and woods beyond were strewn with numerous dead fugitives, the majority of the dead would be those who lay piled like a high tide mark on the field of battle, cut down – or expired – in the press or surrounded in Agricola’s final masterstroke and unable to cut their way clear.
The slopes of Mons Graupius; the area around Boghall (centre of shot) probably endured the brunt of the fighting and the agony of Caledonian collapse.
Butchered where they stood, or as Tacitus records willingly choosing a glorious warriors death in combat these men, the elite front ranks and the keenest stationed behind were these mass casualties. The bulk of Roman cavalry, no doubt finding it difficult to neatly extricate themselves from the mass in the centre of the field that they had been mired in probably hovered on the field to annihilate the remaining opposition while most of the Caledonians made good their escape, Tacitus’s text as good as says so much.
We simply have little way to quantify the magnitude of these Caledonian losses but can elicit a certain understanding.
Just as a "third" is a figure found often repeated for the losses in a major defeat, analysts have also found that in battle wounded casualties outnumber the outright slain, the quoted ratio is 2 out of 3 casualties are wounded, not immediately killed. In modern times this has led, with the benefit of excellent and immediate medical services to a salutary survival rate among the wounded.
While the Romans also had an excellent medical corps on hand, the Caledonians did not and of the numbers of Caledonian slain, it is fairly certain that at least two thirds will have been wounded and dispatched by a sharp thrust as the legions marched over and cleared the field of survivors. Those less badly wounded will have been unlikely to maintain the energy for a successful escape, and along with the greybeards called to arms will have been those most likely to have been cut down in the mounted pursuit that eventually followed.
In summary, Caledonian losses must remain a mystery, but if Tacitus exaggerates freely elsewhere in his work then his conveniently rounded total of 10,000 Caledonian fallen must be viewed with a healthy degree of skepticism.
What of Roman losses?
Clearly any report of heavy Roman losses would not be an acceptable end to Tacitus tale, and of losses he mentions only 360 "on our side". Importantly this phrase does not differentiate between citizen and non citizen soldier losses.
Speculation has gone before that this was limited to citizen losses, auxiliary losses being left unmentioned and unquantified. This is unlikely as we feel the pressures on Agricola were such that citizen losses were the last thing he wished to freely bandy about.
However we have already discussed the techniques of smoke and mirrors Tacitus used in his description of the size of the Roman army, we have not one single reason therefore to believe that he would now change tact over Agricola’s losses on the field.
At the very least we can say that 360 casualties – probably outright fatalities who fell on the field - would be considerably outnumbered by Roman wounded, at least twice as many based on the statistics reviewed above.
Roman medics treating casualties, Trajans Column.
Given that the auxiliary infantry was battered under a noteworthy barrage of missiles for some time, were then caught in an uphill struggle which degenerated into a compressed heaving mass in the field it remains improbable that they escaped as lightly as Tacitus would have us believe.
Sufficient also survives in Tacitus account recalling the fate of the Roman cavalry during the battle; riderless horses, cavalry caught in the mass (witness Aulus Atticus`s fate) and cavalry reported killed in the pursuit to indicate quite clearly that they did not come out of the affair with a clean bill of health either.
Simply put, like Caledonian losses, we cannot be precise about the butchers bill for the Romans.
What we can be sure of though is that notwithstanding the best efforts of Rome’s excellent medical corps many of the wounded will have expired later that day and in the days following from the traumatic cutting and crushing wounds sustained and that Tacitus will not have recorded these.
Ultimately Rome’s losses were undoubtedly higher than Tacitus alludes to but as we have nothing solid to work with we can speculate no further than we have done.
That night, after the battle, the Caledonians warriors will have continued to make good their escape, splashing across the Water of May before fanning out to find fordable tracts of the Earn.
Tacitus account of Roman scouts searching "in all directions" supports a battle on the Clevage Hills, from where the tribesmen would have fled in many directions, desperate to gain their freedom.
Unlike the suggestion by Tacitus the field of battle that night - a ghastly place - was probably deserted by the living except scavengers (of all sorts).
Enslavement or death would have been the lot of any tribespeople found in the area and an eerie silence no doubt lay about the dreadful place.
The Romans will have attended to their dead in a funeral pyre while their wounded will have suffered in their camp under the surgeon’s knife.
In all probability the Caledonian dead, stripped of weapons and valuables will have been left lying where they fell to moulder.
One author, pandering to modern sensibilities has suggested that Agricola may have shared Wellington’s sentiment on the night of Waterloo where, appalled at the slaughter he recorded that "Next to a battle lost, the saddest thing is a battle won".
While this is a poignant sentiment, we have little to make us believe Agricola’s sleep would have been so troubled that fateful night!
Agricola had sought and secured the victory that he had striven long and hard for – and at no small risk of political recrimination to follow. He would have savoured his victory and thought little for the misery and suffering his actions had inflicted on the natives or indeed his own auxiliaries, deployed without the available support that was to hand.
And we need not necessarily think that Caledonian spirit, notwithstanding the misery and loss at personal and family level was particularly horrified. Celtic society prized those who achieved an honourable death in battle, and in time – the magnitude of the defeat meant this would be a generation in coming – they rallied to continue resisting the Romans in the north.
We must put aside modern views therefore as to how this slaughter was interpreted at the time. For the Romans it was a cause for unbridled celebration, just as it would be for the tribes whenever they in turn butchered the Romans. The modern "genteel" Highland sword dance owes its true lineage - we remind ourselves - to the ancient warrior’s exultant celebratory dance over the body and weapons of his vanquished foe.
The charnel house that was the field of battle will have fouled all the watercourses in the area and it will have been the need for drinking water that will have pressed Agricola to break camp at Dunning early the following morning.
A long, long survivor; the name of the battle is remembered locally. This nearby farm is named after the burn which in turn took its name from the fort at the Croup.
Based on the evidence of marching camps the route he took led along the line of the River Earn east towards the Tay, their route shadowing the slopes of the "Croup" (the Ochils Northern Hills) – now silent and deserted Tacitus tells us - where after 11 miles the column, encumbered with their wounded – probably near a thousand - encamped at Carey.
CLICK ON MAP TO ENLARGE
From here, close to the Tay efforts were put in hand to communicate with ships patrolling the Tay. Once contact was made, the fleet – the majority operating out of the sheltered anchorage of Montrose Bay: "Trucculensis Portus" / "Wilderness Haven" were summoned to rendezvous.
Agricola’s army, making one last short move, set up camp at Carpow on the Tay where an embarkation of wounded and reserves for the fleet could be loaded safely given the lateness of the season and the unpredictability of the north sea.
Either here or at Carey Agricola took hostages of the local Horresti (or Boresti) tribe of Fife in guarantee for their continuing submission to Rome, suggestive they had not taken arms against Rome but had perhaps failed in treaty obligations to warn Agricola in good time of the Caledonian mustering taking place close to their territory.
The battle, as Agricola may have anticipated since the previous winter took place on the southern fringes of the northern tribes and Caledonii septs territory, yet he clearly felt the need to intimidate others, unreachable by land given the lateness of the season.
This would hint that the tribes of the far north – probably those north of the Mounth –had not been committed at Mons Graupius.
It was on these, the Taexali, Decantae, Smertae and others on whom the fleet now perpetrated (further?) acts of terror to ensure they got the message loud and clear and did not contemplate rising in opposition to Roman Imperium, now by default likely to land on their doorsteps.
Recently excavated signs of devastation with a likely Flavian horizon unearthed at Birnie near Elgin may pay silent testament to the fleets actions late that year.
CLICK ON MAP TO ENLARGE
The fleet we are told, as well as taking the "terror of Rome before them" were instructed to conclude the navigation of northern waters, proving (what had been a long reported fact) that Britain was indeed an island.
Much has been speculated over this voyage, it being suggested the text describes a complete circumnavigation of the British Isles after exploration of the far northern isles and a siting (only) of far off Thule (most probably Iceland).
More likely, the fleet operating in the east met up in the far northern waters with those flotillas which had been operating on the west coast before returning to over-winter at their anchorage in Trucculensis Portus (Montrose Basin) in anticipation of next years operations in the north.
Afterwards, Agricola retired south. Although Tacitus makes much on Agricola’s slow leisurely progress through the lands of the tribes he conquered during his term as governor - effectively lowland southern Scotland - we cannot help but imagine Agricola, with his prize of glory in battle secure and gained without enormous citizen soldier loss proceeding south with the pretended calm of a shoplifter insouciantly strolling with their ill-gotten gain to the shop exit eager to make good their escape.
Simply, Agricola, well aware his term of office was drawing to a close wanted nothing to jeopardise the apparent finality of his victory. He knew that the lengthy consolidation phase would be the responsibility of others – and nothing positive for Agricola personally would be gained by further action in the field where only further risk ran hand in glove with further confrontation.
In this phase (as well as others we shall return to in the addendums), and also in Tacitus decision to tell us about it we can glean how certain matters may have panned out during the stages that preceded the battle.
Agricola clearly had felt the need to intimidate the tribes of southern Scotland by a show of force and triumphalism after Mons Graupius. Tacitus tells us this plainly. What he does not do is explain why.
Murmurs of dissent over Roman rule in southern Scotland must have been the result once news spread of Roman set backs at the end of the 82 AD campaign season.
This would confirm why Agricola stationed his troops in central Scotland in summer 83 AD before advancing north of the Forth only once intelligence gave him a precise location to march to. Inveresk and Castledykes – camps perfectly sized to accommodate Agricola’s forces – tellingly hold strategic sway over the territory of the main southern tribes; the Votadini, Selgovae and Dumnonii and his massive army would smother any risk of wildfire rebellion breaking out.
These then were Agricola’s real conquests, overrun and studded with permanent garrisons.
Agricola’s standing may have been subsequently swollen by Tacitus’s grand claim that he reached the end of the known world – a phrase used by successive Romans for the lands beyond the frontiers of their time – but Agricola planted no installations in the lands of the northern tribes.
Simply put his experience there was limited to one purely of military campaign, effectively the twin prongs of risk and bloody battle.
©2009 Roman Scotland. All Rights Reserved
First Published February 2009
