Mons Graupius Identified
Mons Graupius - A Reconstruction
Exactly when Agricola crossed back into Scotland in 83 AD cannot be guessed with any certainty. His immediate attention, Tacitus tells us, had been drawn by the premature death of his year old son in early summer.
To distract himself from the grief he turned to operations against the northern tribes though at this stage the implications in Tacitus narrative are that this was restricted to naval operations. This is Tacitus’s "plundering", a poor translation for what was undoubtedly a repeat of the harrying conducted by the fleet the previous year.
As we have already discussed Agricola will have had no opportunity to make good his losses of the previous season with troop drafts from units on the continent as, with the Emperors own campaigns proving problematic, new recruits would be funnelled there.
Tacitus tells us that he reinforced his army with Britons who had through long years of submission proven their loyalty, suggesting southern Britons.
The southern British tribes had been disarmed for almost two generations, sufficient time for them to loose their Celtic martial traditions and practices.
Rather then than imagining that Agricola raised the "Belgic" tribes of southern England, we should imagine that Agricola sequestered natives raised for service in the Roman army and scheduled for transfer to units on the continent.
These troops will have been raw, but induced into the Roman military system and would be clothed and equipped like auxiliary soldiers anywhere else within the empire.
As well as the services of these British troops – at this time it was considered unusual for troops raised in one province of the empire to serve in that area due to fears over previous rebellions under similar circumstances in the past – Agricola clearly had to hand the message he will have received form the Emperor Domitian.
As we have discussed, receipt of this message and the contents therein can only be inferred from other statements and acts Tacitus records Agricola making.
Clearly Agricola was censured for his citizen soldier legionary losses incurred at the end of the preceding season, was advised replacements would not be forthcoming and that Agricola should exercise greater caution and strategic cunning in the use of the forces already available to him.
Agricola perhaps construed the meaning as including auxiliary recruits not yet embarked for the continent.
Finally, while clearly not instructing a halt to campaigning Domitian must have advised Agricola to ensure that he could not be successfully prosecuted at a later date for letting a war "drag on" and thereby "sowing the seeds of future rebellion", and by default causing embarrassment to Domitian’s still young regime.
The threat of Imperial displeasure and loss of patronage, plus the risk of being prosecuted in Rome following his tenure as governor would have been very real and worrying considerations to Agricola, a state of mind in early summer 83 AD that would not be assisted in the least by a family bereavement.
Matters therefore suggest that the campaigning season of 83 AD started slowly. By early summer only the navy were undertaking active operations in the north while Agricola’s land forces, mostly still in their winter quarter forts and fortresses were probably preparing for the forthcoming season while Agricola’s new recruits were hurriedly trained and brought up to standard.
Given that Tacitus admits that Mons Graupius took place late in summer, it was probably near mid summer before Agricola’s columns crossed the modern border before leaguering up in what plausibly appears to have been two large encampments in central southern Scotland.
The first of these at Inveresk in the Lothians (53.2 acres) marshalled together units that marched up the eastern side of England, while a similarly sized encampment at Castledykes in Lanarkshire (60 acres) would accommodate units, likely mostly legionary that came up the west side of England.
As it has been cogently speculated that the very large and unusual legionary fortress at Deva (Chester) was Agricola’s headquarters for operation in the north then it will have been here at Castledykes that Agricola himself would have been based with the western battlegroup.
This gives these two camps an aggregate capacity of 113.2 acres, an area capable of accommodating 25,100 men.
We have already mentioned how the Romans - intractable as ever- would have prioritised reconstruction at the forts attacked in the preceding with troops left in garrison in southern Scotland over the preceding winter probably deployed early in the season to the task.
It is reasonable to speculate therefore, that Agricola’s army waited in two large battlegroups to ease the strain of provisioning for an unpredictable period of time.
Meanwhile his navy attempted to stir up the Caledonians to action again, while the troops above the Forth Clyde line employed in reconstruction work would also have been tasked with active scouting, aimed to identify situations where the Caledonians, tempted into the lower reaches of their territory in numbers could be caught up with quickly and engaged.
And this appears to have been exactly what happened.
Once notified that a major tribal hosting was underway at The Croup (Mons Graupius – the Ochils northern hills) by scouts probably acting out from work at Ardoch or Strageath, Agricola would have immediately ordered an army concentration (expito exercitu) en route to this location.
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Lying reasonably equidistant to both Inveresk and Castledykes (circa 35 and 26 miles as the crow flies respectively), and situated at the junction of natural corridors still in use today is the large probable Flavian marching camp at Dunipace, hard on Agricola’s Forth – Clyde frontier line created in 80 AD.
It is conceivable that the army- with a hard march behind them – could conceivably have concentrated (expedito exercitu) at Dunipace only 24 hours after Agricola received breathless word from a messenger that the Caledonian mustering had been found. This is however a matter we shall return to later.
This large camp, at 115.8 acres, is a perfect match for the 117 acre requirement we have calculated; capable of accommodating 25,700 men.
It is noteworthy that the locality between Dunipace and Camelon is peppered with Roman marching camps suggesting that the area was subsequently used on many occasions as a Roman jumping-off point in pushes north of the Forth – Clyde line.
If the troops out posted in Strathallan left only cavalry vedettes - tasked with maintaining visual contact with the Caledonians - joined Agricola’s army at Dunipace then the arithmetic would appear to suggest that there were somewhere between 6 and 900 hundred of them.
Dunning is around 32 miles (as the crow flies again) from Dunipace and it is inconceivable that Agricola would not have set out after only the briefest of rests, possibly still in the hours of darkness marching hard to reach Dunning before his foe eluded him again.
The Roman army regulation pace could in theory achieve the notional distance in some 8 hours.
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If we allow a plausible 10 hours then it is possible that Agricola startled the Caledonians - who may only have had a few hours notice of unfolding events - fording the River Earn at Forteviot (thereby cutting off a line of Caledonian withdrawal north) and then advancing in battle order.
Agricola's crossing point of the River Earn above Forteviot on the day before the battle. Shot viewed from Dupplin with Mons Graupius clearly visible in the backdrop. Once across the river Agricola most likely advanced in battle order.
Arriving before Dun Knock it is possible he threw up his marching camp by early afternoon that day, potentially within a mere 48 hours of the Caledonian hosting first being detected.
The construction of a marching camp illustrates a combination of factors.
The surviving upstanding remains of the rampart and ditch of Agricola's camp at Mons Graupius; here seen in Kincladie Woods. The slopes of Mons Graupius can be glimpsed through the trees in this shot beyond the far side of the marching camp.
First, no immediate confrontation on the field took place.
Secondly Agricola would have been aware of the effect that around 60 miles marched in somewhat less than two days will have had on his troops battle readiness. Agricola at this stage will also have dispatched embassies to the tribes to seek their submission while meantime planning for their possible failure. Accordingly he will have had the local ground scouted and formulated his battleplan.
With no results from any embassy, the Caledonians took to the field early next day, probably not long after sunrise and certainly before the Romans had formed up.
Did the commanders make speeches to their troops before the battle?
We can never know. Julius Caesar followed tradition and famously addressed his troops before going into action, and as he recorded them in his widely read writings it later simply became formulaic for others to record Roman generals doing the same.
There was no open space in a marching camp to form up all his army and address them as Tacitus would have us believe. This was usually done in the battleline and as Tacitus tells us the Caledonians beat the Romans onto the field then Tacitus has evidently telescoped events for literary convenience.
Agricola, apparently taciturn in character, probably never made any such speech. The Roman deployment was split making this difficult for Agricola to do. Deploying out of Dunning marching camps east gate the auxiliary units – infantry and cavalry - will have marched in column of line a short distance eastwards till they reached a point centred on the position adopted by the Caledonians on the Clevage hills, probably at Garvock along the line now overlain by the modern Bridge of Earn road from Dunning.
"The Mons Graupius battlefield. The Roman auxiliary regiments formed a battleline for approximately two thirds of the width of this shot more or less along the line of the modern road to Bridge of Earn (visible as a dark line lower centre). The lie of the Clevage Hills makes it clear the Caledonians could move to outflank this line at will, a concern which caused Agricola to stretch his battleline and deploy the majority of his cavalry on the flanks of the actual frontline. The brunt of the fighting took place on the lower slopes of the hill near Boghall (right of centre). Agricola's reserve cavalry made its way up the slopes of the escarpment to the west (off picture to the right). Wheeling about on the ridge to the right of shot their subsequent downhill charge into the rear of the - by now - fully committed Caledonian army was the turning point of the battle."
The legions and cavalry reserve, exiting the camps northern gates, either remained in formation immediately in front of the camp, or lay hidden from Caledonian eyes on the lee slopes of Dun Knock, below the ramparts of the iron-age hillfort on its crest – a deployment which merits Tacitus’s phrase "pro vallum" – before the ramparts.
Dun Knock and Dunning in front of the Roman marching camp. Here Agricola carefully posted his legions and reserve cavalry "pro vallum" ; out of sight of the Caledonians beyond. The reserve cavalry - unleashed on the unsuspecting Caledonians - would have a devastating effect on the course of the battle.
A unique view of the initial deployments would have been gained from the summit of Dun Knock, and it is here that Agricola probably positioned himself with the standards and his officer corps, excellently placed to direct Roman actions through the coming fray.
The Caledonian host was a loose amalgam of tribes and family groups. The deployment of the bulk of their army would reflect this, being loosely arrayed along the slopes of the Clevage Hills with "the bravest" – the tribal elite - forming a recognisable battleline at the foot of the hill. It is against this that the auxiliaries were deployed.
Mons Graupius viewed from within the Roman marching camp. The Caledonians noisily forming up would have been clearly visible to the Romans in the camp as recorded by Tacitus.
Indeed it is the very looseness of the Caledonian deployment that would have excited concerns in the Roman command that the tribes would – as they ultimately did – use the lie of the land on the flanks below Middle Third and Craigenroe Hill to descend and wrap around the flanks of Agricola’s auxiliaries.
This was the point at which Agricola abandoned traditional maniple order by thinning his ranks and moving his second line of maniples up, creating in effect one continuous battleline stretching between Dun Knock and Gateside.
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To their front, the chariots of the Caledonians manoeuvred on the plain at the foot of the slope between Pitcairns and Easter Clevage, trying their best to unsettle the auxiliary ranks with feinted attacks and thrown missiles.
And at that, it appears an impasse was arrived at.
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Agricola’s plan was straightforward though cunning and involved not inconsiderable risks. As we have earlier discussed the fear foremost in Agricola’s mind was the possibility of the Caledonians declining combat and disappearing into the high ground, an outcome Agricola had experienced the previous year. Certainly the Caledonians had exhibited particular canniness in refusing to face Agricola’s massed forces while targeting lesser, but still considerable numbers of Romans the previous year in the attack on the IX legions marching camp.
Further, as we have discussed there is sufficient evidence in Tacitus text that indirectly tells us Domitian had warned Agricola not to risk further legionary (citizen) losses while paradoxically advising him not to let the war "drag on or sow the seeds of future rebellion".
Agricola’s deployment therefore was a direct response to these separate influences and constraints, while cleverly using the lie of the land he was presented with at Dunning.
The legions, stationed out of the immediate battleline were given a degree of security so that "the victory would be more glorious should no Roman blood be spilt". Their deployment pro vallum was noteworthy enough for Agricola’s to remember and Tacitus to record all these years later.
In our opinion, pro vallum, in front of the ramparts of Dun Knock would keep this strategic reserve - critically on the flank - hidden from Caledonian eyes on the Clevage Hills beyond.
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Not only would this enable them to come to the auxiliaries aid, it was, we believe primarily aimed to deliver a hammer blow on the flank of the anticipated Caledonian headlong assault on the apparently outnumbered Roman auxiliary battleline.
The auxiliary line was therefore kept deliberately weak, first to prevent an overwhelming show of Roman force dissuading the Caledonians from staying on the field, and secondly - "scorning our puny numbers" - to provoke the Caledonians to descend the hill in a precipitate all-out assault. Agricola’s reserve was placed to attack any such Caledonian frontal assault as it hit home in turn in its flank below Dun Knock.
Simply put, the expendable auxiliary were bait in a well thought out trap, but one still fraught with risk should the – arguably – weaker half of his army be overwhelmed.
Mons Graupius; the Clevage Hills viewed from a Roman auxiliary's perspective.
The famous military maxim cautions that "no plan survives contact with the enemy", suggesting that a successful general is one who can anticipate his opponents moves and have in place plans to deal with developing eventualities.
In this respect Agricola - unfairly criticized by many - did show flair and competence as a commander. This is because, with the armies deployed, and despite the nuisance caused by the cavorting of the Caledonian chariotry, the Caledonian army en-masse showed no inclination to accept the proffered bait to descend the hill pell-mell in a wild and disordered charge.
Clearly the Caledonian elders were no dafties and with an admirable control managed to keep their men, difficult to control at the best of times, in good order on the advantageous high ground of the Clevage Hills.
Forget Tacitean spin, this surely must have disturbed Agricola as the required response would be for him to advance his troops against the opposition sacrificing much of the advantage in his initial "baited trap" deployment. The greater the distance the auxiliaries advanced the greater they would be removed from the legions support while they would also suffer the handicap of fighting uphill, no task to relish.
Agricola however does not seem to have abandoned his plan. Even as he advanced his line close to the Caledonian line it is left a matter of debate whether the exchange of missiles was the reason his line did not immediately close with the opposition or whether again Agricola was merely placing his line temptingly close to the Caledonian mass, a charge of whose front line would probably excite and draw along with them the eager tribal masses crowded behind.
The plain at the foot of Mons Graupius, viewed from the west near Mains of Pitcairns. This shot captures the field across which the chariots rode and over which the auxiliary infantry then advanced to clash with the Caledonian front ranks posted on the lower slopes to the right of shot.
Again the Caledonian leadership appears to have exercised considerable command and control, holding their men in the positions already agreed.
Clearly with his hope of a disordered Caledonian charge appearing less likely, Agricola finally ordered six cohorts of his troops to advance to contact. We have already discussed that this frontage of troops were probably those who faced a formed and recognisable Caledonian battleline, those behind no doubt milling in looser large bodies.
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The cavalry squadrons had already seen off the Caledonian chariots as the battle lines drew closer however it was with the first clash of infantry that the battle "proper" got underway in earnest.
The scene of the fighting viewed from inside the Roman camp. Caledonian chariots, aimed to unsettle the Roman infantry swarmed over the plain they would soon have to advance across. This shot illustrates this well with hay bales making an impromptu appearance as substitute chariots for context.
NEXT PAGE: Mons Graupius - A Reconstruction (Part Two)
©2009 Roman Scotland. All Rights Reserved
First Published February 2009
