Mons Graupius Identified
The Agricola Chapter 37
Key aspects;
The battle now reaches its crisis point and in chapter 37 there is sufficient text to explain what Agricola was waiting for and indeed had planned for all along.
With all Roman forces visible to the Caledonian leadership bogged down in this heaving mass on the field, they ordered a general advance of all the tribal levies so far uncommitted. As these advanced - both sides continuing to recognise the tactical value of the flanks - Agricola saw the opportunity he was waiting for and unleashed his cavalry reserve (who Tacitus had declined to mention when quantifying Agricola’s line of battle).
Agricola clearly anticipated and planned for this sort of general advance by the Caledonians, indeed his very first deployment on the field seems designed to entice the Caledonians to do just that. The Caledonians however cannily maintained their position on the high ground forcing Agricola to send in his under strength battleline to provoke them to do this.
Roman commanders were trained and expected to be able to handle large forces in the field, the occasion would however be unique for the Caledonians and their handling of the affair so far, even with Tacitean spin comes across as commendable.
Something therefore should be sought in the landscape that allows Agricola’s reserve, both cavalry and legionary, to be hidden pending the right moment to deploy. The legions had probably been intended to act as a weight of infantry backing up the auxiliary battleline from behind or hitting one flank or other of the Caledonians if they had charged the original Roman start line en-mass. As it was the Caledonians declined to do this and Agricola was forced to advance, the action moving bit by bit further away from the legions position.
The cavalry however were fast moving and it is likely they eschewed the flanks which had been sucking men in all day and worked their way round to the Caledonian rear before charging with cataclysmic effect. In the face of this fateful hammer blow Caledonian cohesion evaporated.
As the Caledonian formations broke the cavalry on the flanks got moving again now that things had opened up. The chaos and slaughter that ensued is fully covered by Tacitus and requires no repetition here.
The pursuit however seems to have got a bit out of hand after the Caledonians successfully turned on their pursuers, using the landscape behind the battlefield to advantage.
While Tacitus extols the lead Agricola took in organising the steps taken to clear the area, this masks the fact that, going by Tacitus statistics of Caledonian casualties (which are to be considered at best rounded up, at worst inflated) at least two thirds of the Caledonians escaped, not the result expected when around 5,000 cavalry are available for the chase – witness the carnage at Pinkie in 1547 under similar circumstances.
To summarise, some Caledonians, experienced enough to know what they were about sacrificed themselves in this manner and in so doing they successfully brought the worst of the Roman pursuit to a grinding halt, thereby saving their comrades.
Tacitus may claim the pursuit lasted till nightfall, it certainly would get going again once the difficult ground was cleared but it is clear the worst was stalled by the Caledonians actions.
NEXT PAGE: The Agricola Chapter 38
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First Published February 2009
