Mons Graupius Identified

The Agricola Chapter 35

Key aspects;

This chapter covers the Roman deployment and it makes it clear that Agricola only fielded part of his force.

Why would this be?

Firstly, Tacitus is leaning on a situation that evidently took place but reports it in a manner which makes it appear Agricola faced heavier odds than he did in order to magnify his victory.

He quotes 8,000 auxiliaries and 3,000 cavalry while not immediately mentioning Agricola’s cavalry reserve and continues this approach by altogether failing to quantify Agricola’s legionary component.
This all helps Tacitus create the illusion of Agricola battling away when the odds are stacked against him.
In the next section we will examine exactly how many men Agricola had with him at Mons Graupius and it will be clear that here Tacitus is simply embroidering matters for best effect.

Secondly he has the legionaries left out of the main battleline, they being left “pro vallum” – literally in front of the ramparts.

Again, why would Agricola do this?

Tacitus by way of justification states that;

“ victory would be vastly more glorious if it cost no Roman blood, while if the auxiliaries should be repulsed the legions could come to their rescue”

Clearly Agricola was careful with his legionaries, no doubt fearing Imperial wrath if he lost more to enemy action after the events of the preceding year. Auxiliaries though, being non citizen soldiers were - in the eyes of Rome’s elite at least - clearly the expendable canon fodder of the day.

We believe the cynicism goes further however.

If as we will prove there was no inordinate disparity in the size of the two armies, why would Agricola leave so many out of the front line?

We believe Agricola was concerned that if he lined his entire force up in plain view then the Caledonians may think twice about engaging in battle, and battle (with its glory) at the end of the day was what Agricola desperately sought.

Now that he had the Caledonian confederacy’s manpower in the field in front of him the last thing he would wish to do would be to dissuade them from committing to battle.

Lining up his entire force may do this while leaving him without a strategic reserve. Agricola clearly had plans as to the manner in which the battle would be fought and – with a mind to Imperial censure – he arrayed his forces accordingly.

11,000 auxiliary soldiers therefore were fielded, not to intimidate the tribes but to lull them into attacking. Tacitus is quite open in portraying a cynical Agricola, who while keen to protect his citizen soldiers was perfectly willing to hazard his expendable auxiliaries as bait in a Roman trap and in proving this point he has the Caledonians doing what Agricola hoped they would; scorning his “puny numbers"

Pro vallum. This is commonly translated as meaning the marching camps defences, and this is possible if not entirely satisfactory. The phrase however has been attributed at some sites to features in the landscape, some more probable than others. For a fuller discussion see the contending sites section.

The legionary deployment, as well as the reserve cavalry must have been critical to a pre determined battleplan and we should not allow ourselves to be hoodwinked into believing that Agricola - even though he does not appear in the end to have required to use the legionaries - would have left such a major component of his army sitting idly picking their noses somewhere outside his camp with no particularly clear idea of what their intended role was to be. Rank nonsense of course.

Clearly Agricola was egging the Caledonians on to indulge in a precipitate all out attack on his auxiliaries, at which point Agricola could intervene with his cavalry and legionary reserves in a manner that was planned to be the knock out blow.

The Caledonian deployment we have already discussed, however chariots, an archaic feature are mentioned in advance of the Caledonian battleline on the plain, evidence that the battle was fought – in its earliest stages at least - on fairly flat ground suitable for the passage of wheeled vehicles.

At this stage it seems to have become apparent that the deployed Roman auxiliary line was not long enough and in danger of having its flanks over run. Again why would this be, Tacitus has already told us the Caledonians were arrayed first?

We believe this has more to do with the nature of the hill and its extent than the nature of the original Caledonian deployment. Simply put the Caledonians could use the lie of the land to move around or threaten to outflank Agricola’s auxiliaries.

So Agricola massaged his deployment to extend his battlefront - still refusing to use his legionaries - till the line was long enough it would appear to counter the potential problem while being thought all the same as worryingly “thin”.

Clearly a Roman deployment based on defence in depth was abandoned in order to get as many of his auxiliaries into the extended front line. Equally clearly, the hammer blow reserve of the legions and reserve cavalry were left as they were, they being fundamental to Agricola’s battleplan and the “ace up his sleeve”.

Finally Tacitus has Agricola dismounting to show he would not flee the infantry and taking his position in front of the standards. This grand phrase is often used to imply he was in the front rank.
Not at all, the standards would be kept protected out of the thick of the fighting and it is difficult to reconcile Agricola leaving the elevated position of horseback from where he could see what was happening and deploy his reserve at the right moment as he did.

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