Mons Graupius Identified
The Agricola Chapter 25
Key aspects;
Here Tacitus explains the reasons, or on the face of it the lack of real apparent cause which made Agricola go to war with the tribes north of the Forth and Clyde in 82 AD.
The reason Agricola went to war is couched in terms which suggest he was reacting to events that had forced his hand.
This is not in general terms how Tacitus likes Agricola to be remembered – the decisive man of action in control of and directing events. It is therefore probable that these reported “causes” are in the main inventions (as argued by Fraser) and that Agricola undertook a war of conquest and glory which required some later justification.
As justification would normally be required of the Emperor who made such decisions on military enterprises beyond frontier zones- not the Governor as this would appear to hint at - then this looks increasingly like Agricola went to war without a clear Imperial mandate and that the run of the mill happenstance in the north had to be magnified to create the impression of a greater threat in order justify his decision - as the man on the spot - to invade.
Once the flowery language is parsed off the message is quite clear; the tribes above the Forth – probably those of the Venicone and Vacomagi coastal lowlands are “enveloped”, an unsatisfactory modern translation but one meaning in modern usage “over-run” while the eventual response to this suggests it should also mean “harried”. Meanwhile the Caledonii of the highland zone turned to “armed resistance”.
Clearly the lowland tribes of Strathearn and Strathmore were caught unprepared for the storm unleashed on them – so much for their previous warlike manoeuvres - while the tribes of the highland zone had, due to the nature of the protection afforded by their mountainous highland fastness, some time to marshal their response.
And that the Romans at least had active cavalry patrols seeking out opposition in more remote, even highland territory is likely by their stock reference to overcoming “woods and ravines”.
The navy, the Classis Britannia was active harrying the eastern coast – and it is quite likely in this season that the western seaboard likewise received a similar treatment - which dismayed the tribes;
“now that the secret places of their sea (a reasonable description of the western coast) were opened up”.
This simply means the tribes were disheartened to be on the receiving end of a two prong joint arms action by land and sea.
The blitzkrieg effect of sudden assaults on seemingly safe locations in the rear can indeed be debilitating to morale, yet in return the Caledonians now actively visited this upon the Romans.
Agricola was still clearly campaigning in the north (“enveloping the (lowland ie Strathmore / Angus) tribes” – not the highland Caledonii) when the Caledonii took the opportunity to attack “forts”. Such permanent forts would be well to the rear of Agricola’s campaigning column and are unlikely to have been located far north of the Forth Clyde “limes”. (See addendum).
Seeking to confront the Caledonii warbands, and without knowing from which glens they would debouch from the highland zone – Tacitus`s “routes they were using” - Agricola splits his forces into three separate battlegroups.
This infers but in no way proves that the Caledonii were operating in a similar number of warbands. Agricola simply had to get eyes and ears on the ground in sufficient numbers to cover the possible routes the Caledonii were taking and engage them if they made contact.
The size of these battlegroups therefore is suggestive that Agricola in point of fact actually badly misjudged both Caledonian numbers and martial ability - notwithstanding illogical Tacitean gloss that the Caledonians outnumbered the Romans which in itself makes Agricola’s decision to divide his column even more questionable!
He had clearly considered at the time – not with the benefit of hindsight that Tacitus had - that his three detached battlegroups would each be strong enough to stand on its own two feet in a fight, though clearly it would be expected that they would as a matter of course support each other if possible in a co-ordinated manner in the event of action with the Caledonians.
The area meant by “routes they were using” clearly indicates the many glen mouths on the fringe of the highland massif that would continue to similarly preoccupy the Romans over the remaining years of the Flavian occupation.
When considering the areas targeted by the Caledonians (with forts built or under construction at that early date) then the glens facing Stirlingshire and certainly no further north than Strathallan appear to have been the setting for these events.
In so doing he has Agricola “moving forward” or “advancing” to counter the Caledonian threat. This of course sounds upbeat and positive but makes no real sense geographically as Agricola was clearly enveloping tribes in territory where he had not had any opportunity to build forts yet (and Tacitus would surely have mentioned the feat if he had).
The Caledonians, it seems, successfully outflanked Agricola and “roughed up” his line of communications.
Agricola thereafter certainly moved to intercept the routes the Caledonii warbands were taking but it remains almost certain this would involve an about-face to move to engage the enemy from a campaign previously aiming north east but now in a direction which must now have faced south west.
NEXT PAGE: The Agricola Chapter 26 - 28
©2009 Roman Scotland. All Rights Reserved
First Published February 2009
