Mons Graupius Identified
The Historical Summary
The battle of Mons Graupius – the first and indeed best “recorded” battle on Scotland’s ancient soil took place in Iulius Agricola’s last year in office as the governor of Roman Britannia – probably in 83 AD (though 84 AD is considered an acceptable alternative by many).
The extent of the Roman province of Britannia had grown gradually since Claudius’s invasion in 43 AD and by 82 AD, with Agricola’s conquest of Scotland below the Forth- Clyde line now fairly secure, he looked north to the remaining free lands most probably with a view to exploiting natural resources to be found there.
The peoples of these lands, split into many lowland tribes and clan-like septs within the highland massif were generalised by the Romans -and have since come to be recognised- as the “Caledonians”.
In 82 AD therefore Agricola marched his army north and, as in 79 AD when he marched into southern Scotland, he did so intent on conquest, in search of glory, and above all seeking assimilation.
Unable to bring these truculent tribes to early submission, Agricola undertook a wide ranging burning campaign of “frightfulness”- a fairly textbook Roman tactic when dealing with volatile and easily provoked Celts. This campaign may perhaps have extended as far north as the Mounth near Stonehaven.
This calculated intimidation was aimed to force the resolve of the tribes one way or the other. If submission could not be achieved through compliance then the standard Roman approach was to achieve it through open conflict. The aim would be to achieve this in open battle – where the disciplined, well equipped and above all superbly organised Romans usually held all the aces.
Under such circumstances Roman commanders - we must remember they were all politicians as well - could not only achieve their planned conquest but in the manner of doing it secure that most precious of commodities; glory.
In 82 AD however the tribes of the north neither submitted to Agricola nor hazarded open battle against his army, the sheer size of which they would have found staggering. Simply put they will never have seen it’s like before.
On the other hand what the tribes did do was undertake the age old and highly effective tactic of guerrilla warfare – probably at this stage this was limited to the activities of separate tribal elites with their fighting tail of armed retainers.
Here the dispersed units of an overwhelmingly powerful invader were targeted and engaged, usually successfully. We are told for instance that they descended on and stormed various Roman outposts to Agricola’s rear while he was (probably) operating in Strathmore.
The effect of such attacks, snapping at the fringes of Rome’s forces, while not individually particularly noteworthy did however taken as a whole have -as elsewhere in history- a witheringly corrosive effect on the morale of the numerically superior force being thus attacked. It was all the more damaging when it happened along lines of communications in the supposedly safe “rear”.
To counter this threat, Agricola - we are told - split his army into three separate battlegroups to better control the routes his opponents were using. This is a clear reference to the glens which afforded rapid movement within the highland zone and which provided the ready access from which the tribal warbands could spill out onto the lowlands where the Romans concentrated their efforts. In Scotland Roman commanders appear to have been extremely reticent to hazard their infantry columns by entering the highland massif.
The Caledonians displayed both an ability to work in concert and considerable canniness for they then concentrated their forces, targeted the weakest Roman battlegroup- that of the IXth legion – and in a night assault almost succeeded in overrunning the beleaguered Romans before withdrawing in the face of Agricola’s timely relief column.
Following this serious reverse, which either happened at the very end of the campaigning season, or perhaps was of sufficient seriousness to convince Agricola to try another approach he regrouped and retired south to winter quarters.
Next year, 83 AD Agricola - back in Scotland in strength - received word that the Caledonians - now a formally bound tribal federation - were mustering their armed strength at a location known as Mons Graupius; we are told by as many as 30,000 men. Marching hard Agricola came upon them and threw up a camp adjacent to Mons Graupius.
The Caledonians do not seem to have been the least disheartened by these provocative manoeuvres and declined to decamp through the night. Deploying from his camp the next day Agricola launched an assault on the Caledonian ranks on the hill, and by careful deployment of a Roman cavalry reserve at a critical stage he overcame the flanks (and probably the rear) of the Caledonians who at that stage were threatening to envelope the Roman line. This was the critical turning point in the battle which led to a general Caledonian breakdown and in Tacitus’s verdict a rout. From the wreckage of battle the Romans claimed only 360 slain to an alleged 10,000 of their enemy.
Thereafter Agricola retired south through the lands of those he had conquered in his years as governor and within a short period, with his tenure as governor lapsed, left Britannia for Rome, never to return.
The heady events of these years have long inspired generations of readers and it is of little wonder that many have sought to identify the site where these events unfolded.
Indeed the task of identifying the location of Mons Graupius has become to many the “Holy Grail of Scottish Antiquity” and it is to that noble quest that we will now turn our attention.
To date the near universal approach has been to champion a particular site, usually on account of some personal link between the author and the land in question - such as ownership or being resident there - or for academics and archaeologists wishing to magnify the importance of their recent nearby archaeological discoveries.
Further long lasting and pervasive confusion is passed down to us by antiquarians who attributed fine Roman remains to Agricola simply because he was better known than any other Roman who campaigned in Scotland. The simplistic logic being that they had to be his, and to-boot, what better event to link such remains with but his crowning glory at Mons Graupius?
The tangible result of this veritable bouillabaisse of contending sites - and the egos attached to them - is a map of Scotland exhibiting the effects of a blunderbuss discharge, it being peppered with locations championed by so many wildly different and in many cases distinctly partial readings of the available sources.
More recent investigation however has assisted in pulling together information on the nature of these early claimants and one recommended read by Maxwell; “A Battle Lost” has looked at a range of these contenders. The books scope though did not extend to covering all sites nor in providing a measurable review of all these locations. To do so in a fair and even manner, as methodically as possible, and widely available to all has been lacking to date.
This brief summary places the events of 82 and 83 AD and its later appreciation in some context. First we shall look at the sources available to us to further understand these events in greater detail.
NEXT PAGE: The sources available to us
©2009 Roman Scotland. All Rights Reserved
First Published February 2009
