Mons Graupius Identified
The Hill
Tacitus does not make much description of the characteristics of the hill itself.
He mentions the ranks of Caledonians – or tribal warbands - who clustered together in groups- rising in “tiers”.
This has caused some to speculate that the hill will have presented a convex face to the Romans – i.e. a rounded or oval shaped hill and that the tiers would have visible like those of a wedding cake.
However it should be appreciated that even a moderately rounded face will have left much of the Caledonian ranks on the flanks orientated away from and therefore not focused on the action. This is certainly not the impression Tacitus gives, with the extended Roman wings apparently threatened with being overlapped and hence vulnerable to envelopment.
Others reckon a concave shape would better accord with the impression of the threat of the Caledonians wrapping around the over- extended Roman battleline that Agricola was clearly concerned about.
Fraser has quite cogently reasoned that as more bodies push inwards to the focal point of a fight in such a theatre-like profile then the crushing effects of mass crowding that can be deduced from Tacitus narrative would have been the likely result.
Tacitus mentions “up the hillsides” which in itself could possibly record a broken landscape of ridges or the broken slope leading to a length of escarpment, an attractive theory as it allows space for the Caledonians to marshal themselves, face the Roman battleline head-on in a fairly conventional manner and fixes the point of Roman advance in a way convex hills almost always fail to do. The nature of the land to either flank of the Caledonians position would also be telling as Tacitus mentions the cavalry’s progress impeded on the flanks, not just by the solidity of the Caledonian resistance but by the “roughness” of the ground.
Further, a hill, slope or ridges physical emplacement with regard to the likely line of approach by the Romans - in most cases this is dictated by watercourses, terrain and features usually quite remote from the immediate environs of the battlefield- have a bearing on understanding the hills tactical strengths or conversely its strategic weakness. For instance there is no point in the Caledonians adopting an impregnable position if in all probability the Romans were unlikely to obligingly ignore an easier front to assault in preference for the difficult one chosen by the Caledonians situated away from their most likely line of approach!
Nor is a hills suitability assisted where its features leaves its flanks so open that in all probability the Romans would exploit that face as well in the most basic of tactical manoeuvres.
In summary, the manner of approaching and tactically assaulting a hill will vary greatly between each contending site and is based on its physical context. It is the most realistic Roman approach to the hill and the manner of defending and assaulting this that we must carefully review for each location, not hold onto some simple “model” of the basic moves of the battle and apply it broad-brush to each site without consideration of the physical characteristics on the ground there.
Simply put there is little in Tacitus account to firmly identify the nature or profile of the hill or hilly feature which in itself directs us to conclude that there is little to suggest that the hill was the notable, picturesque or distinctly mountainous profile of common misconception, a feature which surely would have merited mention by Tacitus.
The location of many Roman marching camps show that Roman forces often headed towards large hills, and the number of hillforts at these - including the super-sized oppidiums at some - suggests that these hills were tribal landmarks; both military and social focal points. As such it is reasonable to suggest that many will have and would long continue to serve the local tribes as mustering points.
Indeed this is most likely exactly what was happening, or near complete when Agricola caught up with the Caledonians.
A site located near to the communication routes used by the tribes therefore is important. This will include the major arterial valleys, and their connections with the glen openings and watercourses the Caledonii would have naturally followed to leave the highland massif to join up with the hosting of the Venicones, Vacomagi and others.
Also of relevance is the hills location in respect of what the Caledonians would have considered any likely axis of Roman advance.
In the period before the Roman road network had extended far north beyond the Forth, Roman armies could march across country in lowland areas with a fair degree of impunity.
We also should not necessarily restrict their movements to directly upon routes used by their later roads- though that is in itself a fairly telling precedence of routes used and acceptably clear of the worst obstacles to passage in antiquity. This could be features such as marshes which are often now lost to us through modern land improvement.
Did the Caledonians- as some suggest- position themselves astride a route used by a later road to block the Roman advance or could this be done less obviously?
Any such tactically “fixed” position would appear to fly in the face of the strategically aware yet tactically elusive approach adopted by the tribes in the previous year – an approach that met with success. To simply sit and wait for the Romans to turn up seems an over simplification.
An anticipated line of Roman advance could be easily shadowed or flanked -much as it was in 82 AD- from a traditional tribal hosting point located not too far removed from any likely axis of Roman advance but located at a strategic- not tactical- location and as such not directly in the path of the Roman “steamroller”.
Both sides seemed intent on a showdown yet Tacitus we have to remember wrote his eulogy based on recollections given to him well after the event by Agricola. However both Agricola and then Tacitus will have tailored these memoirs somewhat, both had the benefits afforded by hindsight- a conventional battle at the time was not necessarily always a foregone conclusion.
The motivation and pressures on the two commanders would be different. Agricola would be fairly certain this year would be the last opportunity he had as governor to secure the personal glory that would accrue from a victory in the field against the fabled Caledonians.
The Caledonian leadership, as with any confederacy – the rarity of its creation was considered noteworthy – would have been led by a committee of tribal elders spurred on by the realisation of the need to take unified action against a common threat.
The leadership of the confederacy however would still be embryonic enough to harbour the divisions, jealousies, personal animosities and general fall out inherent after age-old feuds between these very tribes, who until now are historically likely to have taken the field usually against each other.
The ability therefore of the leaders of this polyglot force to maintain it at such strength in the field for any length of time is questionable.
If in the event that no decisive action came out of this mass call out – clearly a popular response to the outrage caused by Agricola’s harrying of 82 AD - then it is difficult to see the tribes having sufficient unanimity, at this early historical stage, to recreate this size of host in following years.
For the Caledonian leadership - to quote Burns - now was the time to “do or die”.
How does this influence our understanding of the probable geographical location for the hill?
It is perhaps reasonable to speculate that Agricola caught the Caledonian hosting at a major hill located at or within ready reach of a good communications network, near but not necessarily directly in line with the anticipated Roman axis of advance.
Tacitus makes no mention of the Caledonians employing Fabian “scorched earth tactics” while awaiting the Romans in the far north. The only logical place therefore would be at a location on the southern fringes of the territory of the mustered tribes, a location positioned before the advancing Roman columns could spoil their lands and harry their people yet again.
To choose a site located deep within or even to the north of the tribal lands will have made no sense whatsoever. To do so would have been corrosive to moral and divisive to the unity within the confederation, particularly if some tribes` warriors had to stand by and watch their lands burnt and womenfolk enslaved and not those of others.
The hosting point however was not necessarily the position from which the tribes originally intended to do battle with the Romans. In the event, given the rapidity and perhaps unexpectedness with which Agricola’s forces came up – “expedito exercitu” – the position will have been reviewed by the Caledonian leaders for its suitability to hazard open battle with the Romans (of whose reputation the Caledonians can only have been too well aware) and in this respect its suitability appears to have been considered acceptable.
In so choosing the ability of the mass call out tribal army - intrinsically less mobile in tight situations than the small mobile forces of the tribal elite fielded the preceding year- would have had a strong bearing in rejecting any option for a breakout.
To do battle consensus on both sides is required and this appears to have existed. The hill therefore must have been strong enough yet not too steep to enable Caledonian deployment on its slopes –they adopted a defensive posture - while neither so strong nor so steep that its characteristics proved an inordinately difficult and risky proposition for the Romans who early adopted an offensive posture.
©2009 Roman Scotland. All Rights Reserved
First Published February 2009
