Mons Graupius Identified

The Agricola Chapter 29

Key aspects;

Chapter 29 has frustrated those on the quest to find the site of the battle for generations.

This is almost always because they have been tied to a preconceived view on where they would like the battle to have taken place, particularly those supporting sites in the far north, and chapter 29 is undoubtedly particularly unhelpful to such interpretations.

Accordingly they ignore Tacitus account here and replace it with assumptions which place Agricola starting to campaign from where he had left off the previous year, i.e. where they would like him to be.

This ignores the very nature of Roman campaigning. At the end of each campaign season the bulk of the army would retire south to winter quarters. Roman surges north therefore could be compared to waves on a beach.

However it need not necessarily be assumed that each years campaign was like an incoming tide with progressively further penetration in one direction, attention could just as readily be redirected in another direction after the fruits or problems of the foregoing seasons campaigning had been digested and analysed.

Most modern published accounts of the battle of Mons Graupius like to pepper the pages with the odd choice phrase from Tacitus, the early section of chapter 29 however never appears.

This therefore makes it worth our detailed attention.

The bare bones of events are starkly recorded. Indeed the implication is there by default in what Tacitus – the “garrulous embroiderer” – clearly will not tell us. This is simply because certain things did not happen and no glory attended Agricola’s actions before the battle. Therefore there was nothing in those weeks or months that took place out of the mundane that could be suitably buffed up for posterity. Hence campaigning takes a back seat and much was made of a family bereavement.

He tells us that early in the summer – bear in mind campaigning would get physically underway in the closing stages of Spring – Agricola suffered the loss of an infant son.
In the text Tacitus then tells us that Agricola used the campaign to “distract him” from this loss, the only activity mentioned however is the navy again being sent ahead to “plunder”.

Let us be clear on this, Agricola had to be in the field already in order to come to grips with his opponents but there is not one shred of text that suggests that Agricola was actively campaigning in the far north.

He was certainly not battling again to overcome “woods and ravines” like last year in order to achieve a start line at his previous furthest penetration north for the ongoing “northwards thrust into the unknown” theory beloved by many modern historians.

Tacitus would have told us of this activity and simply doesn’t. This omission is exceedingly telling.

So the actions we do know off are the continuing depredations (plundering) wrought by the fleet – a repeat of what was probably the most effective and from the Roman perspective productive phase of campaigning in the previous year, and clearly considered worth repeating in order to stir the Caledonians to respond.

The land forces, obviously positioned somewhere are not mentioned because they clearly had not taken part, till approximately mid summer, in any sort of noteworthy operations.

It can be reasonably surmised that the sum of the land forces achievement in 82 AD was to blunder about in the wilds with no particularly clear conception of where they were going or how they were going to find and engage the enemy – “when shall we have an enemy? ” Tacitus later records.

However before we censure Agricola and his troops too hard on this point it is worth reminding ourselves that this is exactly what Cassius Dio records happening to Severus’s troops in Scotland in 209 AD and we can equally imagine this was also the lot of most other Roman forces engaged in campaigning in Scotland through the centuries.

Tacitus illustrates perfectly the dilemma of campaigning in the wild terrain of the north; when an attempt is made to confront the tribes via the “routes they were using”, the tribes craftily out-think the Romans (again) and almost succeeded in wiping out a third of Agricola’s army.

So why would Agricola be so concerned for his soldiers?

Notwithstanding that Agricola appears to have realised the futility as well as dangers involved in his large army - either singly or in groups - beating the heather for opponents, Fraser has argued convincingly that Agricola was placed under severe political pressure from the Emperor Domitian in the winter of 82 AD.

As we have mentioned already, manpower was an issue for the Romans at this time as Domitian’s Chatti campaign was greedily swallowing up resources, and indeed, Agricola had been instructed to and did send troops from his command – a theatre of ongoing operations in itself – to support the Emperors problematic campaigns on the continent during 82 AD.

As statements in later chapters would appear to confirm, the loss of experienced legionary citizen soldiers – with recruits in high demand on the continent - in action in Scotland in 82 AD was something that would have drawn, perhaps not imperial censure, but clearly a warning. Agricola must have felt he was skating on thin ice and his decision to “reinforce with some of the bravest of the Britons” – it was unusual at that time to deploy natives near to home - cannot have been taken lightly.

Clearly Domitian seems to have sought explanation from Agricola for undertaking his actions in the north and Agricola no doubt in return received warning that no further troops or replacement drafts for losses incurred would be available in the immediate future.

Further, given the text in later chapters and Agricola’s obvious reticence to deploy legionaries directly in harms way it is reasonable to speculate that he may have even been reminded – at the very least – of the imperial “dim view” that would be taken if further legionary citizen soldier losses were incurred.

Perhaps Domitian finally, like most devious political masters, then ironically instructed Agricola – who by now would be feeling like his arms had been well and truly tied behind his back – to get the matter sorted once and for all.

It seems the logical reading of chapter 29 therefore that the army, available in strength, was kept out of harms way while the ongoing depredations of navy provoked the tribes into action.
It would be held ready for the occasion when it could be deployed to best effect - that clearly being its superiority in conventional open battle - and not employed blundering about the wilds incurring mounting casualties again to no good end.

As well as being militarily sound, this course of action would lead to the least possible political fall-out for Agricola personally.

This is a lot to write to fill in the spaces Tacitus has left blank. However it is Tacitus’s very “garrulousness” that makes it clear we are not being told the entire picture.

This picture would appear to be one where Imperial reproach, or even blame - he earlier bemoans that “blame” falls on the individual alone – could not be successfully embroidered with spin into his narrative and which was omitted as it ran the risk of showing Agricola in less than the best light possible.

We continue;

Immediately we are told that “marching light” Agricola and the land forces reached Mons Graupius which he found occupied by the enemy. This is the first mention of activity by the land forces this year.

There we have it again, no long lead in of extended operations – which again would have been harried by the tribes. He comes to Mons Graupius as clearly this is where intelligence has furnished Agricola with information that the Caledonians are mustering.

This must have been what Agricola had been waiting for, and by “plundering” with his fleet had sought to provoke. His army cannot have been too far away from the Caledonians position in order for him to march directly there.

Why use the phrase “march light” ?

Tacitus original Latin is “expedito exercitu”, a curious antique phrase which has encountered unnecessary difficulties in interpretation.

“Marching light” is the commonly applied translation, as is the alternative “without heavy baggage”. The modern military term “forced march” has also been applied, it being argued that this sits well with the spirit of Tacitus’s tale, and the undoubted reality that Agricola would want to come to grips with his opponents right away especially given the wily Caledonians actions of the previous year. This is an understandable and to all intents a fairly unremarkable situation.

We do not believe however that these are the correct translations.

These translations have a problem. None in Latin are even close to Tacitus original “expedito exercitu”.

The common translations however approximate more closely to:

“marching light”- vacuus gravis paratus

“without heavy baggage” – impedimenta expiditus

“forced march” – vis proficisor

However there is a modern parallel, close to the intent in the literal translation of expedito exercitu ; to “to quickly perform a military manoeuvre”.

What military manoeuvre would an army require to do? The only manoeuvre an army awaiting its marching orders can do is to - using modern military terminology - rapidly “concentrate the army”.

As noted above, apart from sounding positive and proactive a forced march does not tell us much. What would though is if Agricola rapidly “concentrated the army”, the literal interpretation of conducting a brisk military manoeuvre before marching straight to Mons Graupius.

What does this mean for the course of events in early summer 83 AD ?

An army numbering tens of thousands –as well as their livestock and cavalry mounts are a lot of mouths to feed and water.

This force, which we have argued was kept relatively inactive pending the results of the navy’s ongoing campaign above the Forth Clyde line would have been a drain on local supplies and it was commonly standard practice in such circumstances to disperse an army into several large groups. Each would have independent arrangements for provisioning and re-supply, something one central army group area on its own would not have been able to do for any great length of time.

And Agricola clearly would not know the precise timescale by which the Caledonians would be provoked into major confrontation in the field of battle.

We can reasonably speculate some smaller groups would be north of the Forth Clyde line reconstructing the permanent forts wrecked in the previous season and it is likely that it was scouts or patrols from these units that found the Caledonian mustering underway.

In summary the army was in southern Scotland below the Forth – Clyde line, in force in early summer 83 AD and was likely in several separate large battlegroups that would – and did - reunite at a predetermined army concentration point when intelligence came in pin pointing the Caledonian position before setting out north, no doubt at a challenging pace (which we would expect anyway) to catch the Caledonian host before it moved off.

The remainder of the chapter describes the Caledonian mustering and the bare statement that Agricola came to Mons Graupius. There is no mention of how he set up his camp, it therefore was set up close to the hill as a challenge to the tribes in standard Roman fashion.

The numbers of Caledonians and the Roman marching camp are matters that we will return to in the next section of this article.

Meantime we restrict ourselves to two things. Firstly, Caledonian warriors “were still flocking to the colours”, a grand way of saying that Agricola caught the Caledonians while they were still mustering.

Clearly the Roman army was leaguered in southern Scotland, and at the expense of boot leather managed to reach Mons Graupius in what can only have been a fairly short time. Practically this means in days, possibly only a few, not a timescale involving weeks. This has a great bearing on where this theatre of operations took place and where Mons Graupius itself was situated, and it would appear Tacitus is telling us by implication that this is not too far north of the Forth – Clyde line.

Secondly Tacitus also makes no mention of Agricola making any attempts at negotiation before the battle. Open battle was a desperately hazardous affair for any commander in ancient and medieval times.
It is a matter of record that much ancient warfare revolved about march and countermarch, commanders endlessly seeking that special something of advantageous circumstance before hazarding all in a veritable throw of the dice that could easily result in a knock out blow to either side.

Clearly the Romans marched themselves into a position from which they were happy to offer battle and the Caledonians likewise seem to have been happy to rise to the challenge and clearly showed no inclination to debouch elsewhere through the night.

Obviously attempts would have been made by the Romans to offer the tribes terms for their submission to Rome.

Agricola was literally hazarding the majority of the garrison of Britannia in one fell swoop and like Jellicoe at Jutland in modern times, the responsibility of being able to lose the war – and in Agricola’s case the de facto control of the province – in one day would obviously have sat heavily on his shoulders, no matter how “great” the man Agricola was.

Again, Tacitus silence on this entirely predictable episode is telling. Why would he do this?

Speculation can only go so far but clearly any Roman offers were refused or more probably simply ignored. Further, it remains not improbable that any Romans sent in embassies were simply murdered, a simple act by the tribal leaders which would safeguard tribal unity of purpose before the Roman embassies could spread the corrosive poison of divisive offer and counter offer.

This possibility would indeed explain why Agricola would have had no detail of this matter to give to Tacitus for him to later record. Stony silence reigns on the fate of the Roman embassies.

NEXT PAGE: The Agricola Chapter 30 - 32

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